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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 18993 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Joseph Lovato, appeals from a conviction 
and a judgment of Aggravated Sexual Assault, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-405 (1953 as 
amended) • 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury in Third Judicial 
District Court from December 13-15, 1983, Judge Leary 
presiding. He was found guilty of Aggravated sexual Assault, 
a first degree felony, and sentenced to a term of not less 
than five years to life in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks af firmance of the verdict and 
JUliyment of guilty of Aggravated sexual Assault. 
STATEMFNT OF FAC'TS 
Carmelita Romero, the lH yt·ar old victim, mrJVPc1 
Pocatello, Idaho to Salt Lake City in search of employment ,, 
oecemter of 1981. Nils Swenson, a long-time friend of hC>r" 
allowed her to stay at his apartment rent-free while she 
looked for work. Mr. Swenson worked in the oil fields nf 
Wyoming and was out of town most of the time (T. 110). When 
in town, Swenson resided at the Miles Hotel because he was 
almost 60 years old and had no desire to share an apartment 
with female teenager (T. 121). 
On January 17, 1982, at approximately 1:30 a.m., 
Carmelito's cousin Julia brought a group of her friends over 
to meet Carmelita; appellant was among the group (T. 202). 
The vistors departed around 3:00 a.m. because Carmelita told 
them she had to work the next morning. After everyone left, 
Carmelita set her alarm and went to bed wearing a pair of tJlue 
sweat pants, a "Highland Rams" jersey shirt and her panties 
(T. 10). 
About ten minutes later, she heard a knock on the 
door. She opened the door to find appellant standing there 
alone. Appellant asked Carmelita if he could come in and use 
her phone to get a ride home (T. 11). Carmelita was 
hesitant, but reluctantly al lowed him to use the phone h2cause 
he was her cousin's friend (T. 47-48). Appellant went int" 
Carmelito's tedroom and made two phone calls while Carmel1tu 
remained in the living room. After he called, Carmelitu asked 
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appellant to leave because she had to work in the morning (T. 
111. Appellant asked if he could wait inside, Carmelito 
that he wait outside on the corner where it was 
lighted and his ride could more easily find him (T. 12). 
Appellant complained that it was cold outside and preferred to 
remain inside. Once again, she asked him to leave (T. 12). 
At this point, appellant said he didn't want to leave and 
grabbed her by the throat. Carmelito reached for the door, 
but appellant shut it. She then realized appellant had pulled 
a white, pearl-handled pocket knife out and put it to her head 
and throat. Appellant then told her he wanted sex and, if she 
refused, he would "cut [her] cunt." (T. 16). Carmelito was 
frightened and pleaded with appellant not to hurt her (T. 16). 
While Carmelito struggled to escape, appellant dragged her 
into the bedroom, and threw her on the bed. Carmelito jumped 
off, but then appellant threw her against the wall and floor. 
In the process her neck and lip were bruised (T. 90, 169-170). 
As the struggle continued, appellant held the knife to her 
throat and told her to take off her clothes, but Camelito 
refused. Appellant grabbed a towel, placed it around her 
throat and attempted to choke her: however, Carmelito managed 
to pull the towel away from him (T. 19). However, during this 
struggle, appellant pulled Carmelito's sweat pants down and 
forced her to have sexual intercourse. Appellant also forced 
Carmelito to sutrnit to cunnilingus and to perform fellatio (T. 
64-65). 
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After the intercourse occurrerl, rnrmelito 
telling appellant that her "father" was going to be homP 
around 6:00 a.m. She told appellant that Nils Swenson, tht, 
lessee of the apartment, was her father (although he is notl 
and that she must call him because he had to go to work anr1 
might have overslept (T. 22). She telephoned Swenson whilP 
appellant dozed on the bed. As appellant slept, Carmelito 
whispered into the phone "come over here right away." ( T. 24 1. 
It took Nils Swenson about 20 mintues to arrive, As 
he walked to the door he not iced a note being helcl up to the 
window from inside the apartment. It said,"Call a cop, 
please." Carmelito had written the note after calling Nils 
and held it to the window {T. 25). Nils went to a pay phone 
on the corner, called the police, and waited for their arrival 
{T. 27-28; 112-113). 
Carmelito remained in the apartment until the police 
arrived. While waiting, she went into the kitchen and grabb=d 
a knife out of the drawer. She was going to enter the bedroom 
and stab appellant as he lay asleep on the bed. Carmelito 
changed her mind and put the knife back, believing that she 
would go to prison if she stabb;,d him (T. 28). As she put the 
knife away, the police arrived and she ran out the door (T. 
28). 
She approached Nils and the officers, told them she 
had reen raped and that appellant was inside, armed with a 
knife {T. 29). Nils described her as hysterical and in tears 
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as he tried to confort her as the officers approached the home 
to apprehend appellant (T. 114-115). 
The officers approached the front door, which was 
partially open (T. 128). They could see part of the 
appellant, lying face down, asleep on the bed (T. 128). They 
quietly approached appellant and, after a struggle, cuffed him 
and told him he had been accused of raping Carmelita. They 
read him his rights and asked if he would care to give his 
side of the story. Appellant denied having intercourse, he 
stated he was just visiting Carmelita (T. 129). He was 
searched, and a small pocket knife was seized (T. 130-131). 
At this point, appellant was placed under arrest for 
aggravated sexual assault (T. 131). 
Carmelita was taken to Holy Cross Hospital for an 
examination, The examining physician, Dr. Atkinson, noted 
signs to trauma, specifically a bruised lip and red marks on 
her neck (T. 90-92). No semen was found in the vaginal 
specimen taken; however, semen was found in her panties (T. 
158-159). 
While at the hospital, Carmelita was interviewed by 
Gae Duersch, a long-time volunteer from the Rape Crisis 
Center. Carmelita appeared "uptight" and had a red mark on her 
neck (T. 167-169). As they talked, Carmelita was visibly 
upset and weeped (T. 167). During this interview, Carmelita 
recalled the details of appellant's attack and answered 
personal questions, including the date of her last intercourse 
which the Rape Crisis volunteer recorded as January 15, 1981. 
(The date actually was January 15, 1982. It appears that the 
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incorrect year was recorded. Thus, hc>r last <'<insenual sexuziJ 
intercourse was within 48 hours of the rat'e). 
At trial, appellant chose to testify (T. 2111). H' 
changed his story and admitted having sexual intercourse (T. 
209). Appellant testified that he talked with Carmelito aftn 
calling his aunt for a ride home. Carmelita told him that st," 
was pregnant and that her boyfriend had left her and she was 
worried about her future (T.208). She then got up and went to 
the bathroom. When she returned, she was wearing only her 
white jersey and her panties. She asked him to go to becl. 
They then went into the bedroom and engaged in consenual 
sexual intercourse (I. 209). Appellant's theory at trial was 
that Carmelito fabricated the rape in order to obtain an 
abortion and medication for venereal disease, which she 
allegedly suffered from. Appellant admitted he possessed a 
knife that night (T. 203, 204). He testified that he used the 
knife to clean his nails that evening as the group socialized 
with Carmelito. 
After all the evidence was presented and the 
arguments were heard, the jury convicted appellant of 
aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-405 (1953 as amended}. He was sentenced to an 





THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF THE DATE OF 
THE COMPLAINT'S LAST SEXUAL INTERCOURSE 
WAS PROPER. 
A. THE DATE OF THE VICTIM'S LAST SEXUAL 
INTERCOURSE rs IRRELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUE OF CONSENT. 
Appellant asserts that the date of Carmelito's last 
sexual intercourse, as documented by the Rape Crisis 
counselor, should have been admitted to show that she had 
consented to sexual intercourse within forty-eight hours of 
the alleged rape. He claims that this evidence would have 
bolstered his theory that carmelito believed that she was both 
pregnant and suffering from venereal disease and therefore 
consented to intercourse with appellant in order to obtain an 
abortion and medication for the venereal disease by claiming 
that appellant had raped her. (Brief for Appellant at 9). 
The focal point of the trial was the issue of 
consent. Appellant admitted his return to the apartment after 
everyone had left. He admitted having the pocket knife which 
the victim described in his possession that evening and even 
admitted having the knife open to clean his nails earlier in 
the evening. Appellant admitted having sexual intercourse 
with Carmelita but denied that he used his knife to force her 
to submit to intercourse. 
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Appellant's attempt to admit into ev1<ience the dat'" 
of Carmelita's last consenual intercourse presents the issue 
of whether past specific acts of sexual intercourse by the 
prosecutrix may be admitted to show consent where the 
defendant admits sexual intercouse occurred. Inquiry into 
past spcific acts of intercourse with individuals other thcin 
the defendant is irrelevant, highly prejudicial and would 
further deter victims from reporting rapes or other violent 
sexual assaults. 
The inappropriateness of inquiry into the victim's 
past sexual experience has long been recognized. Courts have 
been troubled with finding the proper balance between the 
defendant's right to confront his accuser and senseless 
interrogation of a rape victim. 
In Utah, the case law regarding interrogation of a 
rape victim was originally set forth in State v. Scott, 55 
Utah 553, 188 P. 800 ( 1920): 
Where the defendants admits the 
sexual act, but contends that the 
prosecutrix consented thereto, and where 
as here, she is of lawful age, such 
evidence (general reputation for chastity 
or prosecutrix) is relevant and material 
upon the question of consent. 
188 P. 864. 
[However], the authorities are very 
numberous, indeed the great weight of 
authority is to the effect, that the 
prosecutrix cannot be interrogated on 
cross-examination as to whether she had 
had sexual intercourse with others than 
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the defendant. The doctrine is rosed upon 
the fact, and the great weight of 
authority is to the effect, that specific 
acts of intercourse with others than the 
defendant may not be shown. If it is 
desired to prove that the prosecutrix is a 
lewd woman, that may only be done by 
attacking her general reputation for 
chastity and morality, and not by showing 
specific acts of wrongdoing .•.. 
(emphasis added) 
This principle of limiting inquiry into the victim's general 
reputation for chastity and honesty was reaffirmed in State v. 
Smith, Utah, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936). In Smith, the Court 
explained the logic behind excluding the victim's past 
isolated instances of intercourse with individualsd other than 
the defendant. 
In cases of rape where the 
prosecutrix is over the age of consent, 
her bad reputation for chastity is a 
proper matter for consideration of the 
jury as affecting her credibility and 
bearing on the probability of consent. 
State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 51 Pac 818; 
1 Wharton's Crim. Evid. 481 ••• In some 
jurisdicition the courts hold that the 
prosecuting witness may be examined as to 
previous cts of immorality on her part as 
affecting her credibility as a witness 
[cites omitted]. There are grounds for 
distinction between examination of a 
prosecutrix as to previous conduct showing 
her to be a common prostitute and merely 
as to isolated acts of intercourse. The 
former conduct would indicate a low state 
of morals and affect credibility as a 
witness, while isolated acts might have no 
such bearing. [cite omitted.] [emphasis 
added J 
The principle of excluding past specific acts of 
intercourse is still followed by this Court. In State v. 
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Howard, Utah 544 P.2d 466 ( l'l75) this Court recr>qnized that 
many rape offenses go unreported due t" the "embarrassment dr,, 
humilation" that the victim must go through at trial. The 
Court observed further that all women, regardless of their 
moral character' deserve to be free from forcible violation rrf 
their body, Supra at 469. In an effort to minimize the 
intrusion into the victim's personal life, the Court followed 
the majority rule: that it is improper for the trial judge t 0 
permit inquiry into specific acts of prior misconduct of the 
victim. unless it reasonably appears such evidence would have 
sufficient probative value to outweigh any detrimental effect. 
Supra at 469. 
To determine the probative value of the evidence, 
the Howard court found it helpful to distinguish between two 
types of factual situation in such "consent" cases. First, if 
there was an unwelcomed intrusion, by force or "some form of 
trick or deception" then whatever slight probative value the 
victim's past specific acts of intercourse might have on the 
issue of consent it is greatly outweighed by the prejudice 
against the victim. Second, under the circumstances where the 
parties meet consenually and then the atmosphere changes to 
violence, then the probative value may be found to outwe1ght 
the prejudicial value of admitting prior act of intercourse 
Id. at 470. rn the instant case appellant returned to 
Carmelito's apartment after everyone had been told to leave. 
He gained admitance under the guise of needing a ride home. 
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Thus, he deceived Carmelita into allowing him in. Once inside 
Carmelita's apartment, appellant's use of force and threats of 
f,irce coerced Carmel i to into having intercourse with him. 
under these facts, the Howard test indicates that the 
protative value of the victim's last intercourse is not 
sufficient to outweigh the prejudicial effect of such 
ev ide nee. 
Later in State v. Johns, Utah, 615 P.2d 1260 (1980) 
this Court established the current standard for admitting 
evidence of a rape victim's past promiscuity. In Johns, the 
victim was giving the drunken defendant a ride home when he 
pulled a knife, put it to her throat and demanded she stop the 
car. Once the car was stopped, the defendant forcibly 
sodomized and raped her. The defendant admitted intercourse, 
but claimed consent. This Court concluded that evidence of 
the victim's past sexual relations was properly excluded. The 
Court then stated that such evidence should not be admitted 
unless the "probative value outweighs the inherent danger of 
unfair prejudice to the prosecutrix." 615 P.2d at 1264. In 
balancing these competing considerations, the court explained 
that trial judges should consider various factors, including; 
(a) relevancy and probative value; (b) prejudical effect; (c) 
confusion of the issues and undue consumption of time; and (d) 
substantial justice. 615 P.2d at 1263. The ruling of the 
trial court as to these factors will not be reversed on review 
unless an abuse of discretion is proved. Id. After 
considering these factors in Johns, the Court concluded that 
"specific evidence 
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o" the prosecut ix' s prior sexua 1 cict iv i ty is not relevant to 
the issue of her consent or any nt hr>r material issLH." 
126 4. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed 
particular circumstances of the case, noting that the 
defendant did not know the victim prior to the incident n,c-
Court also stressed that the defendant admitted he drew a 
knife, but denied holding it to the victim's throat, and also 
admitted engaging in sodomy and sexual intercourse. Under 
these circumstances, the Johns court concluded that spec1f 1c 
acts of past consensual intercourse with another had no 
bearing on consent in this instance. Id. 
The factors which led to the exclusion of the 
evidence in Johns are all present in the instant case as well. 
Here, appellant had never met Carmelito prior to the evening 
that he sexually assaulted her. Like the defendant in Johns, 
appellant admitted having his knife out that night but claimed 
he only used it to clean his nails. Appellant a 1 so admitted 
engaging in sodomy and sexual intercourse. Just as this Coun 
concluded in Johns, Carmelita's past sexual activity with 
other men has absolutely no bearing on whether she consented 
to sexual act on this particular occasion with appellant, who 
was a total stranger. See State v. Geer, 13 wash. App. 71, 
533 P.2d 389, 391-92 ( 1975). 
The appropriateness of excluding evidence of 
Carmelita's last intercourse is apparent when the factors 
specified in Johns are examined. First, the evidence lacked 
-1 2-
relevance and prol:Etive value. As noted in Johns, "[t]he fact 
tl:at a woman consented to sexual intercourse on one occasion 
is not substantial evidence that she consented on another. 
" 615 P.2d at 1263 (quoting State ex. rel Pope v. Superior 
Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976)). Accordingly, in 
the instant case, the victim's previous act of sexual 
intercourse with others "has little if any relevancy to the 
question of her consent in the situation involved here." 
Johns, 615 P.2d at 1263 (footnote omitted). At trial, 
appellant conceeded that coitus occurred; therefore, there was 
no need to admit evidence of Carmelito's last intercourse to 
explain the presence of semen. The only purpose served by 
admitting such evidence was to inflame the jury and possibly 
acquit the defendant in spite of overwhelming evidence of 
guilt. State v. Geer, 533 P.2d 389. Even if relevant, the 
prol:Etive value of her previous acts of intercourse was so 
slight as to warrant exclusion in the trial judge's 
discretion. The appellant contends this information was 
nee es sa ry to prove to the jury that Carmel i to thought herself 
pregnant and, therefore, framed the appellant in order to 
obtain an abortion and treatment for the venereal disease that 
she allegedly suffered from. Yet the topic of Carmelito's 
possible pregnancy and the motive to lie were discussed 
throughout the trial (T. 70, 80, 146-147, 208). Judge Leary 
properly limited inquiry into Carmelito's past sexual 
activities because such evidence had little or no probative 
value given the already thorough 
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presentation of appellant's theory. Leary µroµerly 
excluded this evidence which lacked relevance and µrol:Btive 
value. 
Second, the evidence would have been highly 
prejudicial. Johns, supra. Appellant sought to combine the 
date of Carmelita's last intercourse with the allegation of 
pregnancy and the presence of a loathsome social disease to 
portray the victim as a harlot. The prejudicial nature of 
this line of questioning is clear. Even if appellant's 
unfounded acquisations were true, this line of inquiry is 
improper. As noted in Howard, even the most morally bankrupt 
woman deserves protection from forcible violation of her body. 
544 P.2d at 469. Appellant presented testimony of the 
possibility of Carmelita being pregnant, there was no need to 
put her on trial and further humilate her. 
Third, admitting evidence of Carmelita's past sexual 
activity would have needlessly confused the issue and resulted 
in unnecessary delay. Even one question concerning her last 
intercourse would have confused the jury. While appellant 
claimed that only one or two questions would be asked, it is 
clear that the examination would not end there. The state 
would then be forced to present evidence to rebut appellant's 
character attack. This would have placed Carmelita on trial, 
confusing and inflaming the jury while disorting attention 
away from the innocence or guilt of the individual actually on 
trial. 
-14-
Fourth, if substantial justice is to be done victims 
nf violent sex crimes must feel free to report the crime 
without fear of unwarranted harrassment and senseless 
pulication of the most private aspect of their lives. 
Appellant suffered no hardship by excluding this evidence; he 
was able to testify that Carmelito said she was pregnant and 
unsure of what to do. Substantial justice would not be 
by placing the victim on trial. 
As in Johns, the appellant met the victim for the 
first time, admits the possession of a knife and admits 
intercourse. Under these facts, consenual intercourse on 
other occasions with men other than the defendant is 
irrelevant to consent in this situation. Even if relevance is 
found, the evidence is not probative given the other evidence 
in the record. Clearly whatever slight benefit this evidence 
may have had for the appellant, the harm to the victim clearly 
outweighs the speculative benefit to the defendant. Johns, 
supra. 
Although decided before Johns, this Court held that 
it was proper to forbid the defendant from questioning the 
prosecutrix about her pregnancy and abortion, where the 
defendant argued that the rape was fabricated as a 
justification for the abortion. See State v. Van Dam, Utah, 
554 P.2d 1324, 1326 (1976). There, the Court noted that it is 
"elementary that the trial court has wide discretion as to the 
extent of (cross] examination." Id. at 1326. In Van Dam, the 
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fact of the victim's pregnancy at thP t im<> nf u,,, rape was 
established. The jury was also informed that the victim 
obtained an abortion after the rare occurred.Beyond that, thP 
court reasoned, the history of the pregnancy was no part of 
the incident or crime, but was "a fishing trip where the trir 
was unnecessary and impertinent • Id. The jury was 
informed of the motive to fabricate the rape but did not 
believe the defendant's scenario. The court concluded the 
defendants argument was without merit. 
In the instance case, appellant's argument is 
equally without merit. The jury was apprised of the 
possibility that Carmelita was pregnant and in need of an 
abcrtion (T. 70, 80, 146-147, 208). The jury was also 
informed that Carmelita was in fact given the mandatory 
medication administered to all rape victims which induces an 
abcrtion and protects against venereal disease (T. 102). The 
jury was fully aware of appellant's contention that the victim 
was perhaps fabricating the rape as a pretense for obtaining 
an abort ion. The jury choose not to believe appellant's 
argument. Going into the details of the intercourse which led 
Carmelita to believe that she was pregnant woulrl have been 
irrelevant and immaterial. Moreover, it is unlikely the 
information would have aided appellant; the intercourse 
occurred just two days before the rape. The jury, 
justifiably, would find it doubtful that anyone would be so 
certain of their pregnancy after only two days. 
As in Van Dam, the appellant brought out the 
victim's motive to lie. There was no need to delve into 
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details that would only inf lame the jury, confuse the issue 
anrl possibly result in grave injustice. Judge Leary properly 
Pxercised his rliscretion in limiting the scope of cross 
examination. 
Other jurisdictions have dealt with the 
admissability of past specific acts of intercourse by the 
victim. People v. Martinez, Colo., 634 P.2d 26, 31 (1981); 
State v. Jones, Hawaii, 617 P.2d 1214 (1980); Interest of 
Nichols, Kan, App., 580 P.2d 1370 (1978); State v. Ryan, New 
Jersey, 384 A.2d 570 (1978); State v. Cosden, Wash. App., 568 
P.2d 802 (1977); Pack v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 241 (1977). 
From a review of the cases, there appears to be a consensus 
that evidence of past specific acts of intercourse are 
adrnissably only when the defendant denies having sexual 
intercourse yet semen is found in or around the victim's 
vagina. If semen is found, then the defendant needs to inform 
the jury that the complainant had sexual intercourse recently 
in order to explain the presence of semen when he denies 
intercourse occurred. Where the defendant admits intercourse, 
there is no dispute as to who depositied the semen. In this 
case appellant admits intercourse; had he denied it, he would 
have perhaps teen entitled to adrni t evidence which suggests 
that another deposited the semen. Such is not the case here. 
The appellant sought to elicit the date of Carmelito's last 
conse nua 1 intercourse, combine it with the allegations of 
pregnancy and venereal disease to make Carmelita appear to be 
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a lewd woman, not to offer an explanation of whu depos1tiec1 
the semen. 
In People v. Martinez, supra, the Colorado Supremc-
Court concluded that evidence of a prior sexual act with 
another that could explain the presence of semen in the 
victim's vagina was admissable where the defendant claimecl no 
sexual intercourse occurred. The Colorado court noted in 
footnote that had consent been claimed the evidence would have 
been excluded under Colorado's "rape shield" statute which 
precludes inquiry into post specific acts of intercourse, as 
does Utah case law. 634 P.2d at 31 n. 7. Thus, the Colorado 
court recognized the limited circumstances where prior sexual 
intercourse has protative value -- where such information is 
need to explain the presence of seminal fluid when the 
defendant claims that he never had intercourse with the 
prosecutrix. 
In State v. Jones, Hawaii, lil7 P.2d 1201 (1980), the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that, in a prosecution for 
forcible rape and sodomy, evidence that the prosecutrix 
consented to intercourse with another man within forty-eight 
hours of the alleged rape was irrelevant and not probative of 
the issue of consent where the defendant admits intercourse. 
The Jones court further noted that had the defendant denied 
intercourse and offered the evidence to refute the source of 
the semen then a different result might have been reached. 
617 P.2d at 1220-1221. 
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Similarly, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence 
thdt the prosecutrix had sexual intercouse shortly before the 
incident. In re Nichols, 580 P.2d at 1374. The court 
reasoned that because the defendant admitted intercourse, 
showing trat the semen came from another source would have no 
relevance. Cf. 580 P.2d at 1374. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a similar 
result in State v. Ryan, New Jersey, 384 A.2d 570 (1978). The 
court held that evidence showing that the complainant had 
sexual intercourse the night before the alleged rape was of 
such low probative value that it was within the discretion of 
the trial judge to exclude the evidence. 384 A. 2d 570. In 
Ryan, the defendant. admitted intercourse, but claimed consent. 
The court discounted the logically flawed notion that consent 
on one occasion with another person creates an inference of 
consent in another instance. 
The court of Appeals of Washington has also 
addressed the issue of the admissability of specific act of 
intercourse which the victim engaged in shortly before the 
alleged rape. State v. Cosden, Wash. App., 568 P.2d 802 
( 1977). The court concluded that if the defendant denies 
sexual contact, yet the post rape examination shows evidence 
of recent sexual contact, then all recent partners which could 
account for those test results become relevant and admissable 
within the trial court's discretion. The court found it 
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unfair to deprive the defendant of the oprorturiity to show Hie 
test results were not inconsistent with his denial of 
intercourse. Id at 80n. The court held, however, that th,, 
trial court did not abuse its discrtion in excluding the 
evidence t::ecause the proretive value of the evidence was weaf 
and unpersuasive in light of the overwhelming evidence of thf' 
defendant's guilt. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that evidence of 
recent sexual intercourse is admissable if combined with 
medical evidence that sperm could live for the period t€tween 
sex and the time of the postrape examination, if such evidence 
would tend to prove that the semen present resulted from an 
earlier consenual sexual relationship. Pack v. State, Wyo., 
571 P.2d 241, 245 (1977). Again, this evidence would only be 
helpful where the defendant denies any sexual contact. Id. 
245. The source of the semen is not at issue where the 
defendant concedes that coitus occurred; the only issue 
remaining is whether the coitus t::etween the defendant and the 
prosecutrix was consenual. 
Appellant's effort to admit evidence of the 
prosecutrix's prior specific sexual contacts runs contrary to 
Utah case law and, indeed, the case law of a majority of other 
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Judge Leary did 
not abuse his discretion in refusing appellant's attempt to 
inflame the jury and divert attention away from the relevant 
issue -- whether appellant forced carmelito to have sexual 
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intercourse against her will, 
B. THE DATE OF THE VICTIM'S LAST SEXUAL 
INTERCOURSE rs IRRFLEVANT TO THE 
CREDIBILITY OF HER TESTIMONY. 
Appellant also asserts that evidence of Carmelito's 
past specifi-: acts of intercourse should have teen admitted in 
order to attack her credibility. 
In putting forth this assertion, appellant concedes 
that the issue of consent and credibility overlap somewhat in 
a rape case. For that reason, Respondent's argument under 
Section A of this Point is applicable here, because the only 
attack made on Carmelito's credibility is that she actually 
consented to sexual intercourse with the appellant. 
It should te noted early on that appellant's 
counsel, Brooke Wells, conducted a long and thorough 
cross-examination of Carmelito and had ample opportunity to 
attack her credibility. In fact, the transcript contains 
fifty-six pages of intense cross-examination of the victim (T. 
31-87). 
"It is elementary that the trial court has a wide 
latitude of discretion as to the extent of 
[cross-examination]." Van Dam, supra; See also, State v. 
Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972). The 
longstanding rule has teen that a defendant may attack the 
credibility of the prosecutrix by showing evidence that her 
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reputation in the community is that of a prostitute, 
supra at 865. However, specific acts involving the 
prosecutrix may not be admitted. 1.2_; see also State v. 
Goodliffe, Utah, 578 P.2d 1289, 1291 (1978). Appellant seeks 
to circumvent this rule and delve into specific acts of 
intercourse. 
In State v. Johns, supra, this Court stated that 
"the law does not and should not recognize any connection 
between the veracity of a witness and her sexual promiscuity." 
615 P.2d at 1264. The fact that Carmelita engaged in 
consenual sexual intercourse before being raped has no 
relevancy to the truthfulness of her testimony. 
The lack of logical connection between one's sexual 
conduct and their ability to truthfully testify was well 
explained in State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, Ariz. 545 
P. 2d 946 ( 1976). The court noted that if the sexual 
activities of a rape victim are admissable to impeach her 
credibility in a rape prosecution, then her sexual history 
would be admissable to impeach her credibility in any case in 
which she testified, Id. at 950. No jurisdiction has adopted 
such a rule. 
If Carmelito's past acts of intercourse affected her 
credibility, then the appellant was free to admit extrinsic 
evidence to show she had a bad reputation for truth and 
veracity. None such extensive evidence was proffered. 
Appellant simply sought to inf lame the jury by creating the 
appearance that carmelito was a harlot by a single 
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act of intercourse, because he was unable to impeach her 
through allowable cross-examination. Appellant's argument is 
without merit. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in limiting the cross-examination to relevant evidence. 
C. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS 
ACCUSER WAS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
IMPINGED BY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF 
CROSS-EXAM I NATI ON. 
Appellant asserts that the trial judge's limitation 
on the scope of cross-examination of the prosecutrix violated 
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Davis v. Alaska, 
415 u.s. 308 (1974). 
Appellant's argument is wholly without merit. The 
victim, Carmelita Romero, was present at trial, testified in 
open court in the presence of appellant, and was subjected to 
thorough cross-examination by appellant's counsel. The Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, requires only that the defendant be able to 
introduce relevant and admissable evidence. Johns supra; see 
also United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 272 (8th Cir. 
1978). Appellant was permitted to adduce evidence so as to 
challenge the victim's assertion that the intercourse was 
against her will. Appellant extensively cross-examined 
Carmelito as to any bias or motive she might have had to 
fabricate this sexual assault. The jury did not accept this 
argument. A review of Carmelito's most recent consenual 
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intercourse would have added nothin'I relevant. 
It is a welll settled principle of law that the 
extent of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial judge. State v. Anderson, 27 lit ah 2d 27F,, 4gc, 
P.2d 804 (1972). This discretion will not te interferrecl wi'I 
by the reviewing court unless there is an abuse of discret 10n 
to the actual prejudice of the defendant. State v. Belwood, 
27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P.2d 519 (1972). 
There was no abuse of discretion here. Judge Leary 
allowed the prosecutrix to te asked whether she told the 
defendant she was pregnant (T. 20). The judge also allowed 
appellant to testify that Carmelito said she was pregnant and 
concerned about her future. Thus, her motive for fabricating 
the rape were clearly before the jury with ample opportunity 
for consideration by them during deliberation. Cf. State v. 
Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982). Furthermore, appellant 
has offered no proof of actual prejudice, only unsubstantiated 
conjecture. 
POINT I I 
THE LOSS OF APPELLANT'S KNIFE WAS NOT A 
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AS A DELIBERATE 
SUPPRESSION OR DESTRUCTION OF MATERIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellant contends that he was denied Due Process 
the loss of his pocket knife which occurred after the 
preliminary hearing but before the trial. Appellant makes 
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this assertion even though he admits that he had the knife 
with him that evening, but testified that he orly used it to 
clean his nails (T. 203, 204). Appellant brandished the knife 
shortly after reentering Carmelito's apartment (T. 15). 
Appellant told her that he wanted to have sex and if she 
refused he would use the knife. At this point, Carmelito 
µleaded with appellant that he not harm her. She was dragged 
into the bedroom and raped. 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) held that 
destruction of evidence violates Due Process when the 
prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request for 
evidence that is "material," not is the sense of might have 
effected the outcome, but rather "if the omitted evidence 
creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." Id. 
at 112. The good faith of the police officer is not examined 
because it is not relevant. The focus is on the harm done to 
the defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In 
short, appellant must prove that the lost evidence is so vital 
to the issue of appellant's guilt or innocence as to 
constitute a fundamental unfairness. State v. Stewart, Utah, 
544 P.2d 477 (1975). To prevail, appellant must show, 
therefore, that the presence of the misplaced knife would have 
created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, not otherwise 
present, and that the knife was so vital to his case that a 
funrlamental unfairness resulted from proceeding without the 
knife present. 
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In State v. Nebeker, Utah, f,57 l'.2'1 ll',9 (1983), tee 
defendant claimed a denial of Due Process because of the 
disassembly of photo arrays. The defendant argued that the 
arrays were prejudicial or exculpatory in that the credihil!ly 
of the victim's subsequent identification of him from a lineo; 
would have been weakened if defendant's picture was included 
in the first array. 
This Court in Nebeker, supra quoted from State v. 
Hudspeth, 22 wash. App. 292, 593 P.2d 548 (1978) in rejecting 
appellant's argument; "The mere possibility that an item of 
undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense, or might 
have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 
'materiality' in the constitutional sense." Nebeker, supra at 
1363. 
Similar to the defendant's argument in Nebeker, 
supra, appellant's claim is based on the mere possibility that 
the lost knife might have affected the outcome of his trial. 
Appellant merely contends that because the knife had only a 
small dull blade, the admission of the knife would have had a 
less frightening and less threatening impact on the jury 
(Brief for appellant at 18). Apparently appellant fails to 
realize that any knife, no matter how dull, is a dangerous 
weapon when placed against one's throat. The sharpness of the 
knife is not at issue; the only issue is whether the knife was 
used to coerce Carmelito into sutrnitting to sexual 
intercourse. The jury found this to be the case. 
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It is incredible to suggest that the presence of the 
knife would have been helpful to appellant. If a small, dull 
knife is less frightening than a large, sharp knife, then no 
knife at all would be even better for appellant's case. It 
requires a fancifull imagination to conclude that the presence 
of the knife would even be "material" to the appllant's 
defense. Agurs, supra at 112. It requires still greater 
mental gymnastics to conclude that the knife was so vital to 
the issue of appellant's guilt or innocence that its loss 
would constitute a fundamental unfairness. Stewart, supra at 
479. There was no showing of actual prejudice to the 
appellant, only tenuous speculation of some nebulous benefit. 
See Codianna v. Myers, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101, 1106 (1983); 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-113 (1978); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 ( 1963). The knife was in no way 
rnateri al. In fact, the absence of the knife probably was 
beneficial to the appellant and thus this argument clearly 
lacks merit. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Appellant was convicted of Aggravated sexual Assault 
tn violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-5-405 (1953 as amended), 
which provides, in pertinent part, (1) A person commits 
aggravated sexual assault if: 
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(a) In the course of a rape or at temi•ted 
rape or focible sodomy or attempteo 
forcible sodomy: 
(i) The actor causes serious bodily 
injury to the victim; or 
(ii) The actor compels subnission to the 
rape or forcible sodomy by threat of 
kidnapping, death, or serious bodily 
injury to t:e inflicted imminently on any 
person. 
Appellant contends that the evidence was 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to convict him of aggravaten 
sexual assault. Appellant does not deny having sexual 
intercourse with Carmelito, who, by his own admission, he had 
never met before. Nor, does he deny he had a knife in his 
possession. Therefore, the only issue on appeal is whether 
the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant compelled 
Carmelito to subnit to sexual intercourse by threats of 
serious bodily inJury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 ( 1953 as amended), 
provides that an act of sexual intercourse takes place without 
the victim's consent in either of the following circumstance: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim to 
subnit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnest resistance as might 
reasonably be expected under the 
circumstances; or 
(2) The actor compels the victim to 
subnit or participate by any threat that 
would prevent resistance by a person or 
ordinary resolution; 
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Applying this standard in State v. Herzog, Utah, 610 P.2d 1287 
(1980), this Court stated: 
The determination of whether, given the 
above legal standard, consent was present 
or absent in any given case is factual in 
nature, and is thus a matter for 
determination by the finder of fact. This 
Court will hence no overturn any 
determination in that regard unless there 
appears of record such evidence that 
reasonable minds could not agree with the 
verdict reached. 
Id. at 1283. See also State v. Myers, Utah, 606 P.2d 250 
( 1980). 
The standard to be applied in insufficient evidence 
cases was recently set forth in State v. Petree, Utah, 659 
p. 2d 4 4 3 ( 19 8 3) : 
[W)e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
at 444; see also State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 
1168 (1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980). 
on review, this Court is obligated to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the verdict. State v. 
Redford, Utah, 550 P.2d 728 (1976); State v. Howard, Utah, 544 
P.2d 466 (1975). Thus, it is not the function of this Court 
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to reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Tt1is was 
recognized and well-stated in State v. Lamm, supra. The c"ul 1 
stated: 
It is the exclusive function of the Jury 
to weight the evidence and to determine 
the crediblity of the witness, and it is 
not within the prerogative of this Court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the 
fact-finder. This Court should only 
interfere when the evidence is so lacking 
and insubstantial that reasonable men 
could not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 231. (emphasis added). See State v. Simms, Utah, 517 
P.2d 1315 (1974). 
The evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict. The evidence shows that appellant 
compelled Carmelita to subnit to sexual intercourse by holding 
a knife to her throat and threatening her with serious bodily 
harm. These threats were coupled with appellant striking 
Carmelita in the mouth and by throwing her around the room 
when she resisted. The appellant's violence and threats of 
violence overcame Carmelita's reasonable resistance. 
Carmelita was grabbed by the throat when she asked 
appellant to leave. Her testimony was corroborated by the 
examining physician and the experienced volunteer from the 
Rape Crisis Center who both noticed red marks on her neck 
(T. 90-92, 167-169). 
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Appellant continued to choke Carmelito as he put the 
knife to her throat and told her, in his vernacular, that he 
wa11ted to have intercourse and would cut her vagina if she 
refused (T. 16). He then dragged her into the bedroom ancl 
threw her on the bed. Carmelito jumped off but was repeatedly 
thrown around the room and struck in the head and back (T. 
19). As the struggle continued, the knife was lost and 
appellant grabbed a towel, and put it around her throat and 
attempted to choke her (T. 19). She managed to pull the towel 
away only to find appellant had romoved his pants. Carmelito 
sutmitted to sexual intercourse out of fear for her life (T. 
20). 
When the police arrived, Carmelito immediately ran 
out of the house. Mike Davis, one of the officers present, 
described Carrneli to as "very upset" and "on the verge of 
tears. 11 (T. 127). As the officer enterecl the apartment to 
apprehend appellant, Carmelito remained with her friend Nils 
Swensen as he tried to calm her. Mr. Swenson described her as 
hysterical and in tears (T. 114). 
After appellant was apprehended, the officers 
transported Carrnelito to Holy Cross Hospital for a post rape 
examination. The post rape examination showed evidence of 
trauma. In addition to the two red marks on her neck, she 
sustained a bruise to her lip during the struggle (T. 90-91). 
See State v. studham, Utah, 572 P.2d 700, 701 (1977). The 
InJured lip was also observed by the volunteer form the Rape 
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Crisis Center (T. 169-170). 
The volunteer from the Rape Crisis Center also 
noticed signs of emotional injury. Carmelito first appeared 
"uptight" (T. 168). As the volunteer counseled her, she grew 
"weepy and upset." (T. 167). The volunteer, Gal Duersch, said 
that it was typical for a rape victim to change their mood 
during the conversation, as the rapport is established betwee 11 
the victim and the counselor (T. 167-168). She further 
observed that in her six years as a volunteer at the Rape 
Crises Center she found the lack of physical evidence normal, 
finding only emotional evidence was the normal situation (T. 
171). 
At this point, it is clear that sufficient evidence 
supports the verdict of guilty of aggravated sexual assault. 
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 
veridict establishes that Carmelito subnitted to intercourse 
only after making a reasonable effort to resist even though 
appellant had threatened to slit her throat (T. 21). There 
was clearly sufficient evidence to find that appellant forced 
Carmelito to subnit to sexual intercourse under threats of 
death or serious bodily harm. 
Moreover, there is nothing inherently improbable 
about the victim's testimony. Appellant's brief merely 
pointed out discrepancies in the evidence. It is the jury's 
task to resolve such conflicts. The jury observed the 
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...,itnesses and judged their credibility. They chose to believe 
r·armelito's version of the events. Her testimony was 
substantially corroboI:"ated by Nils Swenson, Officer Davis, Dr. 
Atkinson and Gae DueI:"sch. There was substantial evidence to 
suppol:"t the verdict and there is nothing inherently improreble 
about her COI:"I:"oborated version of the facts. Hence, this 
Court should not disturb the verdict because the evidence was 
clearly sufficient for reasonable minds to conclude that 
consent was absent. Herzog, at l 2A 3. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
A. THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
INSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN 
"CONSENT" AND "AGAINST THE WILL." 
Appellant's counsel subTiitted the following 
instruction, here labeled "Proposed Instruction A," which was 
refused: 
Proposed Instruction A 
An act of sodomy or sexual intercourse 
is without the consent of the victim when 
the actor compels the victim to subnit or 
participate by force that overcomes such 
earnes resistance that her age, strength 
of body and mind make it reasonable for 
her to do under the cirucmstanes; or by 
any threat that would prevent resistance 
by a person of ordinary resolution. Such 
force or threats need not be limited to 
physical violence but may also include 
psychological and emotional stress or a 
combination of all three. Furthermore, it 
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it not necessary to show that the \'ic't im 
engaged in heroics or subjected hPrself to 
great brutality or suffen·d or risked 
serious wounds or injuries, 
The law recongnizes a of 
factors which should be considered to 
determine if a sexual act was performed 
with or without the consent of one of the 
parties. One factor is evidence of marks 
or bruising on either party reflecting 
actualy physical violence. Another 
factor is the opportunity to escape of 
whether the victim made an outcry. These 
can be reflected in the time of the of the 
incident, the isolated location of the 
incident, the possible sources of 
assistance in the sexual activity to the 
victim and any active participation by the 
victim. Likewise, the ease of assertion 
of the forcible accomplishment of the 
sexual act with the attendant difficulties 
of defending against such an assertion, 
and the proneness of the victim to assert 
force or violence when she realizes that 
her activities are likely to be discovered 
may also be considered. These factors and 
any which you may find in the evidence or 
lack thereof, can be considered by you in 
determining whether or not the victim 
consented to the sexual acts alleged to 
have occurred. [emphasis added]. 
The trial court also refused the following 
instruction offered by appellant: 
Proposed Instruction B 
The essential element in rape in the 
forcing of intercourse upon a woman 
"without her consent" and "against her 
will." These terms do not mean the same 
thing because such an act might occur in 
circumstances which would be "without her 
consent" but which would not necessarily 
involve overcoming her will and her 
resistance, both of which must be proved. 
If one of these elements has not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty of 
rape. 
-3 4-
The jury was instead instructed as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
You are instructed that sexual 
intercourse occurs "without consent" under 
any one of the following situations: 
1. When the actor canpels the victim to 
subnit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnes resistance as might 
reasonably be expected under the 
circumstances; or 
2. The actor compels the victim to 
subnit or participate by and threat that 
would prevent resistance by a prson of 
ordinary resolution, 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
In determining whether the victim's will 
and resistance were overcome, it is 
appropriate to consider that this may be 
accomplished by either physical force and 
violence or by psychological or emotional 
stress imposed upon her,or by a 
combination of them. As to the degree of 
resistance required: The victim need do 
no more than her age and her strength of 
boyd and mind make it reasonable for her 
to do under the circumstances to resist. 
It is not necessary that it be shown that 
she engaged in any heroics or that she 
otherwise risked the assailant's brutality 
or infliction of serious wounds or 
injuries. 
Though not mentioned by appellant, the jury also 
received the following instruction: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
Where there is a conflict in the 
evidence you should reconcile such 
conflict as far as you reasonably can. 
But where the conflict cannot be 
reconciled, you are the final judges and 
must determine from the evidence what the 
facts are. There are no definite rules 
governing how you shall determine the 
weight or convicing force of any evidence, 
or how you shall determine what the fact 
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in this case are. But you should 
carefully and conscientiously consider and 
compare all of the testimony, and all of 
the facts and cirucmstances, which have a 
bearing on any issue, and determine 
therefrom what the facts are. 
Appellant asserts that he was precluded from 
presenting his theory of the case by the trial courts failure, 
to instruct the jury on the difference tetween "consent" and 
"against the will" and what factors the jury may wish to 
consider in deciding the issue of consent. 
Appellant made a timely objection to the trial 
court's refusal (T. 251-252) but was not entitled to the 
proposed instructions. The jury was adequately instructed as 
to the elements of the offense and of the definitions 
involved. Appellant's proposed instructions constituted an 
unwarranted judicial comment on the evidence and were properly 
refused. 
The first paragraph of appellant's instruction, 
which has teen included and labeled as "Proposed Instruction 
A," is fair summation of the law. It is substantially 
equivalent to Instruction 14, which was given to the jury. 
Instruction 14 closely follows the language of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-406 (1953 as amended), which provides: 
An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or 
sexual abuse is without consent of the 
victim under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim 
to subnit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnest resistance as might 
reasonably by expected under the 
circumstances; or 
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(2) The actor compels the victim to 
subnit or participate by any threat that 
would prevent resistance by a person of 
ordinary resolution; 
instruction 14 also states that both physical threats and 
psychological coercion can t:e used to overcome the victim's 
resistance. This language is found in State v. Studham, Utah, 
572 P.2d 200 (1977). The gist of Instruction 14 is that 
physical violence is not necessary to have the intercourse be 
against the victim's will. The first paragraph of appellant's 
proposed instruction, included as "Proposed Instruction A," 
supra, also conveys this statement of the law. 
The second paragraph of appellant's Proposed 
Instruction A is totally unacceptable. It allegedly "informed 
the jury" what factors it "can" take into account in 
determining whether Carmelito consented to sexual intercourse. 
The second paragraph is nothing more than an attempt to have 
the judge argue the defendant's case from the tench. It 
directs the jury to consider the lack of bruising, the 
opportunity for escape and the possible advantage to the 
victim in consenting to intercourse, all of these "factors" 
were amply argued by the appellant; there was no need to have 
the judge help in appellant's argument 
Judge Leary properly refused this instruction as a 
comment of the evidence. Judicial comments on the evidence 
were condemned in State v. sanders, Utah, 496 P.2d 270, 275 
(1972) and State v. Schoenfeld, Utah 545 P.2d 193, 197 (1976). 
-37-
The jury was instead given Instruct inn 3, su;•ra, which 
accuratley stated the law, directiny the jury to "carefully 
and conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimc-,ny, 
and all of the facts and circumstances which have a bearing <)n 
any issue, and determine therefrom what the facts are." Thb 
is a proper summation of the law; anything more would be an 
improper comment of the evidence. 
The second paragraph on Proposed Instruction A also 
includes the warning that the charge of rape is easily made 
and difficult to defend against. see Proposed Instruction A, 
supra. This court has held that a defendant is not entitled 
to such an instruction. State v. Studham, Utah, 572 P.2d 700, 
702 (1977). The Studham decision correctly observed that such 
an instruction is not favored because it is actually a 
directive to the jury as to how they should view the evidence. 
Id. JudgP Leary properly refused this instruction. 
Appellant also requested an instruction on the 
difference between "without her consent" and "against her 
will," this instruction has been included here and for the 
sake of reference labeled proposed Instruction B, supra. 
Studham, supra, states in dicta that the two above phrases are 
not of the same meaning. Id. at 702. The not ion is that 
intercourse could occur without the victim's consent yet not 
involve overcoming her will by force or threat. Id. at 702. 
Appellant sought to have an instruction echoing the language 
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found in Studham. He received an instruction summarizing 
ttiis distinction in Instruction 14, supra. The language in 
Instruction 14 parallels the language in Studham. The 
instruction correctly states that either force or threat may 
he used to overcome the victim's resistence. This follows 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (1953 as amended) and Studham. 572 
P.2d at 702. The remainder of the instruction is directly 
from Studham and states the degree of resistance required to 
prove ooth "without her consent" and "against her will." 
Thus, Instruction 14 fully informed the jury of the meaning of 
"intercourse ••• without her consent" as Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-402 (1953 as amended) defines rape and as explained in 
studham, supra. 
The jury was properly instructed of the relevant 
law, The appellant's proposed instruction on the factors 
relevant in determing consent were properly refused. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION ON THE 
LAW OF INCONSISTANT STATEMENTS. 
Appellant's counsel subnitted the following 
instruction, here labeled "Proposed Instruction C," which was 
refused by judge Leary: 
you are instructed that if a witness has 
made statements prior to the trial which 
are inconsistent with the testimony at 
trial, and that at the time of his prior 
statements he had adequate opportunity to 
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perceive the event or condition his prior 
statements narrates, explains, or 
describes, you may consider su ct1 prior 
statements to l:::e substantive evidence in 
this case of the truth of those prior 
statements has spoken falsely either at 
the trial or on that prior occasion. 
The proposed instruction was rightfully rejected. 
The topic was covered in both preliminary instruct ions anrl 
Instruction 3, supra. It is possible that this actual purpose 
behind the proposed instruction was to have the judge draw 
attention to the alleged inconsistancies in Carmelita's 
testimony, thereby leaving the impression with the jury that 
the judge thought Carmelito's testimony deserved little 
weight. 
It is axiomatic that the credibility of witnesses is 
a jury question. The court instructed the jury that they were 
to reconcile any conflict in testimony where possible and 
decide which testimony is truthful! if the conflict in 
testimony cannot be reconciled in Instruction 3, and in the 
Preliminary Instructions (R. 49). This is all the guidence 
necessary. Proposed Instruction C, if accepted, would have 
amounted to a judicial attack on the victim's credibility in 
the guise of a jury instruction. 
Appellant's assertion that an instruction was 
necessary to inform thejury that past inconsistent statements 
could be considered as substantive evidence is without merit. 
The jury was instructed to consider all of the evidence; the) 
were free to believe any inconsistent statements that defense 
counsel may have brought out to impeach Carmelito. The 
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preliminary and final instructions conveyed to the jurors the 
iml"'rtance of carefully analyzing all of the evidence in 
111q what was fact rather than fiction. 
The general rule is that jury instructions are 
c:ons1derer1 as a whole. State v. Brooks, Utah, 638 P.2d 537 
(1981). On review, the trial court's ruling will t:e reversed 
only when the failure to give a proposed instruction denies 
the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Shabata, Utah, 678 
P.2d 785 ( 1984). The refused instructions did not deny 
appellant a fair trial. Judge Leary's refusal of the proposed 
instructions merely eliminated unwarranted judicial comments 
on the evidence. The instructions which Judge Leary gave to 
the jury properly conveyed to the jurors the relevant law of 
the case without suggesting any favortism towards either the 
state or appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
excluding the date of the complainant's last consenual sexual 
intercourse. The rule in Utah has long teen that it is 
improper to inquire in past specific acts of intercourse. 
Specific acts of intercourse are irrelvant to the issue of 
consent in the instant case and inquiry into past acts of 
intercourse is also highly prejudical. Moreover, this would 
only serve to further deter rape victims from reporting rape. 
This Court recently held that such inquiry should be forbidden 
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unless the prorative value of the evidence outweighs the 
unfair prejudice to the prosecutrix. Johns, supra. Here, 
appellant was not prevented from presenting his theory of 
case to the jury. Inquiry into the date of the intercoursP 
would have had little, if any, prom t ive force. 
The loss of the knife did not violate appellant's 
due process rights. Appellant fails to demonstrate how the 
knife was so vital to his case that proceeding without it 
resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. Stewart, supra. 
Additionally, there was overwhelming evidence to 
support the verdict of guilty of aggravated sexual assault. 
Appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with Carmelito 
and further admitted that he was carrying a knife on the night 
of the attack. Carmelito's testimony that appellant used 
force and threats of force was substantially corroborated by 
the testimony of the examining physician and the vounteer from 
the Rape Crisis Center. Disinterested third parties noted her 
bruised lip and red marks on her neck along with her 
distraught demeanor. The appellant's version, however, was 
supported by only his self-interested testimony. The jury's 
verdict was supported by substantially corroborated evidence 
and, therefore, should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Finally, the trial court correctly instructed the 
jury as to the applicable law. Appellant's proposed 
instructions constituted unwarranted judicial comments on the 
evidence and were properly refused. The instructions given, 
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1o1iiefl cnnsidered as a whole, were more than adequate, The 
pr>J lant is unable to show that the failure to give his 
proposed instructions denied him of a fair trial. The 
appellant had a fair trial and was represented by competent 
counsel. His convict ion and sent should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY subnitted this J's-I day of August, 
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